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This article illustrates how the industrial organization of a banking
system aﬀects economic growth in a partially dollarized economy. I study
a model where banking competition has some potentially good and some
potentially bad eﬀects for growth. I analyze how important they are quati-
tatively and, surprisingly, they do not seem to matter much. The main
reason for this is that while competition leads banks to oﬀer consumers
a "better deal" on their deposits, this does not lead to a large increase
in the savings rate. The eﬀect depends on the main structural parameter
values of the economy. In particular, if there is a high demand for liquidity
insurance. I calibrate the model for the Bolivian economy and show that
the growth rates under both systems are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent literature on dollarization has focused on the characteristics of partially
dollarized economies, where dollars and local currency each account for much of
t h ee c o n o m i ct r a n s a c t i o n s .A tt h em o m ent, much of this literature has identiﬁed
the dollarization level of the banking system as being a particularly important
variable to analyze the eﬃciency of monetary policy.1 But, little attention has
been given to the eﬀects of the banking system structure on growth in this type
of economies.
This paper tries to ﬁll this gap, analyzing jointly the themes of banking
structure, growth and dollarization. I set up a model where the eﬀects of the
industrial organization of the banking system can be studied in a systematic
way. It is an overlapping generations model where banks can hold reserves
in local and foreign money and, a priori, it is not clear whether competition
or monopoly would be better for growth. Both systems have advantages and
disadvantages. Then, I calibrate the model and show that, quantitatively, the
industrial organization of the banking system does not matter much for growth,
since the diﬀerences between both systems are negligible.
The works that most relate to this theme are Boyd, De Nicoló and Smith, [5]
and [6], who analyze crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems
in the ﬁrst paper and discount window policy in the second one. Antinolﬁ
et.al.[2] is the only reference where the dollarization of a banking system has
been studied in a model with multiple currencies in a spatial-separation-and-
limited-communication framework. This framework is also used in this paper,
but here, to analyze growth. The model actually used, closely resembles the
models of Champ, Smith, and Williamson [9], Antinolﬁ, Huybens and Keister
[3], Bhattacharya, Haslag and Rusell [4], Haslag and Martin [15], Schreft and
Smith [23] and Smith [24].
The theoretical model I use is based on Paal, Smith and Wang [20], but
modiﬁed to analyze growth in partially dollarized economies. I show that higher
growth rates can be reached in either system depending on the speciﬁcv a l u e s
that the economy presents, particularly the values for the probability of a liquid-
ity shock and the risk aversion coeﬃcient. When these values are high, it means
that people are demanding more liquidity insurance, therefore banks will hold
more reserves and less investment. Since proﬁts for the monopolistic bank come
from investment, this bank has the incentive to invest more than the competitive
banks, so growth will be higher under monopoly.
The diﬃculty of extracting a deﬁnite conclusion arises in the monopolistic
case, where growth rate could be positively or negatively related to the nominal
interest rate or inﬂation. In the competitive system there is no doubt that
growth is positively related to inﬂation. This is the "Mundell-Tobin" eﬀect. It
runs counter to the standard intuition, although there is some evidence that
higher inﬂation does lead to higher growth rates in situations where the initial
1See, for instance, De Nicoló, et al.[11] who study the beneﬁts and risks associated with
a dollarized banking system and Castro, et al. [8] who analyze the ﬁnancial vulnerability of
partially dollarized economies.
2inﬂation rate is low.2
The key results are presented and proved as propositions and those that
turn out very complicated to prove, as in the monopolistic case, are shown
numerically. Some patterns can be extracted from the numerical simulations.
First, growth will be very sensitive to the coeﬃcient of risk aversion Arrow-Pratt
and the probability of liquidity demand; while growth is not very sensitive to the
proportion of this demand as related to either local or foreign currency, especially
if gross nominal interest rates are low. Second, for most parameterizations,
growth will be higher under a competitive banking system, except when the
values of the risk aversion coeﬃcient or the probability of liquidity shock are
high.
I show that the rate of growth of the economy can be divided in two eﬀects:
a" s a v i n g sr a t e "e ﬀect and an "investment allocation" eﬀect. The Mundell-
Tobin eﬀect appears, when the "investment allocation" eﬀect is higher than the
"savings rate" eﬀect.
The "savings rate" eﬀect acts through the ability of banks to provide insur-
ance to depositors and it is negatively related to inﬂation. The reason is simple,
when inﬂation (nominal interest rate) increases, it distorts the ability of banks
to provide insurance, and thus banks oﬀer a less attractive return schedule to
depositors, so they save less. The "investment allocation" eﬀect acts through
an interaction between two other eﬀects: the "peso" and the "dollar" eﬀects.
When inﬂation increases, banks hold fewer reserves in domestic money, in fact
they substitute domestic currency with foreign currency, but this is not a one-
to-one relation, the reductions in local money are higher than the increases in
foreign money and so they also increase investments. In the model there are
three assets: investment and currencies. We can talk about an asset substitu-
tion where the peso eﬀect dominates the dollar eﬀect and also promotes capital
accumulation.
The contribution of this paper to the dollarization debate is that the indus-
trial organization of the banking system does not aﬀect dollarization at all. It is
proved that the level of dollarization is exactly the same under both structures
and depends primarily on inﬂation and the proportion of people who demand
local or foreign currency.
I calibrate the model for the Bolivian economy, using yearly data, to check
how large or small the diﬀerences in growth rates can be between the two sys-
tems. In a similar exercise for U.S. and Japan, Paal, et.el.[20] show that these
diﬀerences could be either signiﬁcant or negligible and are country speciﬁc. For
the Bolivian economy in almost all the cases the economy reaches the same rate
of growth under both systems with extremely small diﬀerences. I conclude that
the diﬀerences appear unlikely to be important in practice.
I perform sensitivity analysis to see the eﬀects of changing parameters one
at a time ceteris paribus, the others staying ﬁxed. Two main lessons can be ex-
tracted from these exercises: First, de-dollarizing the economy or in other words
2Bullard and Keating [7] showed that a permanent increase in inﬂation actually has a
positive eﬀect on growth rates in countries where the initial inﬂation rate was very low, as the
Mundell-Tobin eﬀect would predict.
3having a fewer demand for liquidity in dollars, increases the growth rate but in
a very small magnitude. In fact the growth range between full dollarization
and no dollarization is less than one percent. Second, real rates of growth are
very sensitive to the liquidity demand and the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
Growth is negatively related to these parameters and small variations of them
are associated with huge variations in the rates of growth under both systems.
Welfare is higher under the monopolistic banking system for values of β (weight
given to future generations) higher than 0.8.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the gen-
eral environment to be used. In section 3, the three types of structures for asset
trading are presented: no intermediation, competitive banks and a monopolistic
b a n k .I ns e c t i o n4 ,Ic o m p a r et h er e a lr a t e so fg r o w t hw i t hc o m p e t i t i v ev e r s u s
monopolistic banking systems in a general equilibrium framework. Section 5
undertakes the welfare analysis, section 6 is the empirical section devoted to
the numerical simulations for the Bolivian economy and in section 7 the main
conclusions are reported.
2 The Environment
This is an overlapping generations model (OLG), where agents live for two
periods. The economy consists of two identical locations (islands) where a con-
tinuum of agents with unit mass is born in each period. There are three types
of agents: depositors, ﬁrms and banks
The distinguishing characteristic of this economy is that there are two cur-
rencies in circulation, pesos and dollars, the former of which is issued by the
Central Bank and denoted by Mt. I assume the nominal local money stock
grows at a rate σ set exogenously. Thus Mt+1 = σMt,w i t hM−1 > 0 given as
an initial condition. An initial old generation with unit mass owns M−1 and also
the initial capital stock k0. Dollars can be bought and sold on an international
market at the beginning of each period and the price level in dollars is always
e q u a lt o1( p∗
t =1 ). The domestic price level pt is determined in the market
that meets at the beginning of the period.
Both currencies share the role of store of value, but they also share a trans-
actions role which is generated by the random relocation of people between the
two spatially separated islands (see Townsend [25]). This setup allows money
t ob ed o m i n a t e di nr a t eo fr e t u r nb yo t h e ra s s e t s . I na d d i t i o nt ot h et w od o -
mestic islands, there is an "outside" or "foreign" island that represents the rest
of the world. A fraction π of young depositors in each of the domestic islands
is notiﬁed that they will be moved to either the other domestic island or the
foreign one.3 From this probability of becoming a mover, a fraction θ will move
to the domestic island and will need pesos, and a fraction 1−θ will move to the
foreign island and will need dollars. In this way a demand for both dollars and
domestic currency is generated.
3Some people from the foreign island are also sent to the domestic islands each period, so
that the number of people on each island is unchanged.
42.1 Depositors
Depositors, are identical ex ante but not ex post when they become movers and
non-movers. When young, they supply labor inelastically and it is their unique
endownment.
Let c1t and c
j
2t denote the ﬁrst and second period consumption of a young
depositor. Here the superscript j stands for agent type; j = m for movers in
pesos, j = f for movers in dollars and j = n for "non-movers". A depositor has






























where ρ is the intertemporal rate of substitution. I assume ρ ∈ (0,1),t h i s
means that I will concentrate in economies with small income eﬀects. Working
with ρ>1 (large income eﬀects), will have counterintuitive consequences. In
particular, reserve-holdings by banks will be increasing with the nominal interest
rate (the opportunity cost of holding reserves). This is not the empirically
plausible case (Shreft and Smith [23]).
2.2 Firms
Firms do not play a big role as economic agents, in particular, they make zero
proﬁts, because there is perfect competition. They just produce the single good
at each date, using capital and labor as inputs. Consider a production function







with α ∈ (0,1), Lt is labor input, Kt denotes the capital input and kt is
the aggregate capital-labor ratio.4 Each individual producer takes kt as given.
This externality is what allows constant returns to scale, necessary to sustain
long-run, endogenous growth. In this model there is no attempt to "ﬁx" this
externality.5
As factor markets are competitive, both factors are paid their marginal prod-
ucts. Let wt denote the real wage and rt the rental rate of capital. Then:
rt = F1(Kt,L t,kt)=αA (3)
wt = F2(Kt,L t,kt)=( 1− α)Akt ≡ w(kt) (4)
where we use the fact that in equilibrium kt = kt.
4See Romer [22].
5The economy might have a better outcome in equilibrium if the government were taxing
somebody and paying a subsidy on capital to encourage more investment.
5The gross real rate of return on capital investments between t and t+1will
be given by:
Rt = αA ≡ R (5)
Notice that with this assumption, the production function is a standard Ak
production function. I am using an endogenous growth model because I want
to look at how banking structure potentially aﬀects long-run growth rates. For
simplicity I assume that there is complete depreciation.
2.3 Banks
The other last type of agents are the potential bank operators. There are N of
these which constitute a competitive banking system, while N =1constitutes a
monopolistic banking system. Bankers care only about second period consump-
tion, and are risk neutral. With intermediation, banks own the capital and
therefore, the depositors are the indirect owners. In the next section I explain
in detail this issue.
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period t,a
new generation of agents is born. Firms rent capital and labor, produce goods,
and pay their factors of production. Final goods are then either consumed or
invested to create next period’s capital stock. In particular, young depositors
choose how much to save (allocate portfolios). This savings may or may not
be intermediated. If they prefer the market, they invest in primary assets, if
they prefer banks they make deposits and banks invest in primary assets. These
primary assets are pesos, dollars and capital.
At this point, agents cannot move between or communicate across locations.
Goods and capital can never be transported between locations. There are also
risk-sharing issues, because agents do not know whether or not they will be
movers (see Diamond and Dybvig [12]). Relocation shocks then are realized,
and as people know where they are going to move, they convert their assets into
currency, and move.
3 Financial Intermediation and Asset Trading
In this section I describe how assets are traded in the economy. This model of
intermediated trade resembles that in Paal et.al.[20], but with the addition of the
demand for dollars. Particularly there are three schemes: i) no intermediation,
ii) a competitive banking system (N>1) and iii) a monopolistic banking system
(N =1 ).
3.1 Unintermediated Asset Trade
At time t young depositors receive wt and decide how much to save in capital
and in money (domestic and foreign). After these portfolio allocations have
ocurred, each depositor is informed if she will be moved or not. Depositors
6learning their types, meet in a market where relocated agents sell their capital
investments to non-relocated agents for cash. Then relocation occurs.
Let st = wt −c1t be the saving of the young depositor at t, it the amount of
his capital investment, mt real local money holdings and ft real foreign money
holdings. Let qt be the price of a unit of capital in the post-relocation capital






t denote the capital and real money holdings
in both currencies of a young depositor after having traded at the capital resale
market.6
The constraints that a young agent faces can be formulated as:
c1t ≤ wt − st (6)





















































maximize (2) subject to (6) and non-negativity constraints on consumption and
asset holdings. Let the optimal value of each choice variable zt be denoted by








+( 1− π)e i0n
t =e it
πθe m0m
t +( 1− π)e m0n
t = e mt
π(1 − θ)e f
0f
t +( 1− π)e f0n
t = e ft
It is straightforward to see that if the following arbitrage argument holds:
qt = pt = p∗
t =1 (7)
agents’ optimal choices in equilibrium are described by:
e i0m
t =0and e f
0f
t =0 = ⇒ m0m
t =e it + e mt + e ft (movers in pesos) (8)
e i0m
t =0and e m0m
t =0= ⇒ f0m
t =e it + e mt + e ft (movers in dollars) (9)
6Again j = m,f,n signiﬁes agents type.
7e m0n
t =0and e f0n
t =0= ⇒e i0n
t =e it + e mt + e ft (non-movers) (10)
e it =( 1− π)e st, e mt + e ft = πe st (11)
Since agents can re-optimize their portfolios after they have learned their
types, they will choose an initial portfolio so as to make the maximum proﬁt
from the change in the relative price of capital in terms of cash from pt to qt
and p∗
t to qt, so equation (7) must hold. Note that equations (8) and (9) express
the fact that after relocation shock is realized, movers convert all their assets in
local and foreign money respectively, while equation (10) tells that non-movers
convert their assets into capital. This way, the capital resale market will be in
equilibrium if:
(1 − π)(it + mt + ft)=it
implying (11).





















































3.2 Competitive Banking System
Now consider the case where young agents deposit their entire savings (st) in
ab a n ka n dt h e r ea r eN>1 banks.7 The bank then allocates the deposits
among pesos, dollars and capital. Banks behave as Nash competitors, so they





t ) for movers in pesos, dollars and non-movers respectively.
Competition among banks for depositors then implies, that, in equilibrium,




t to maximize the expected utility of
a representative depositor.




tst for j = {m,f,n} and
agents will choose their savings level, st to maximize:

















































































as a function of the return vector received, and wage. Note that the function
V is identical to the function (13).





t to maximize (15) subject to the following constraints:
(i) Bank assets cannot exceed bank liabilities:
mt + ft + it ≤ st t ≥ 0 (16)
(ii) Payments to relocated agents must be made with currency
πθdm






t ≥ 0 (17)
π(1 − θ)d
f
t st ≤ (ft − b
f
t ) t ≥ 0 (18)
(iii) Payments to non-relocated agents must be ﬁnanced out of income from the
bank’s capital investments, plus any reserves it carries between periods.
(1 − π)dn












t is the quantity of pesos and dollars carried between periods.
Notation 1 Let It ≡ R
pt+1
pt −→gross nominal interest rate in pesos; I∗
t ≡
R −→gross nominal interest rate in dollars; γt ≡ mt
st −→ratio reserve-deposits
in pesos and γ∗
t ≡
ft
st −→ratio reserve-deposit in dollars.8
8That is γt and γ∗
t is the fraction of assets a competitive bank holds in pesos and dollars
respectively.
9The following lemma shows the optimal level of reserves that a competitive
bank will hold
Lemma 1 If It > 1 then bm
t =0and b
f
t =0 ,s o
γt =
θ




































≡ γ∗ (It) (21)
Proof. It is easy to show that when cash is a dominated asset (It > 1) then
it is not optimal to carry reserves between periods, so bm
t =0and b
f
t =0 .T h e n
using equations (16) to (19) we have:
πθdm






















t st = Rit = R(1 − γt − γ∗
t)


























Solving these equations we obtain (20) and (21).



























Next, I describe some useful properties of the functions γ(It) and γ∗(It)
Lemma 2 γ(It) has the following properties:















(iv) γ0(It) < 0



























(iv) γ∗0(It) > 0
It is shown that γ(It) is a decreasing function of inﬂation while γ∗(It) is an
increasing function of inﬂation. This is a typical result in dollarized economies
where, as inﬂation grows, people tend to escape from inﬂation substituting local
money with foreign money.9
Related to dollarization we are going to deﬁne the "degree of dollarization"















Proposition 1 A higher nominal interest rate (which comes from higher inﬂa-
tion) makes the banking system more dollarized, i.e. Φ0(It) > 0
It is straightforward to prove this result by taking the derivative of (23).
Remember that because R is constant in this model, looking at the eﬀect of
changing variable I, really means looking at the eﬀect of changes in the inﬂation
rate.
9In fact hyperinﬂation episodes have been the main reason of why countries have dollarized
in the 80’s.
113.3 Monopolistic Banking System
Now I consider the situation where N =1 . It is known that in a monopolistic
banking system, the bank will be able to extract surplus from depositors, so
we must consider the outside option of depositors. I assume that agents can
intermediate their savings or trade in post-relocation resale markets, but they
can not use both systems. I model the monopolistic bank announcing the returns
b dm
t , b d
f
t and b dn
t to which agents respond either by choosing a savings level (b st)
and depositing it with the bank or by avoiding the bank altogether, investing
in primary assets, and trading in the capital resale market.10
The potential good thing about monopoly here is that it leads to a higher
level of investment, since all of the monopolist’s proﬁts are invested. With this
assumption, I am maximizing the potential impact of this eﬀect.11
I assume also that the timing of events is such that agents cannot withdraw
deposits until after the post-relocation capital resale market closes. Thus agents
who save in the bank cannot engage in additional asset trading. This assumption
was also implicit in the analysis of competitive banks.12
As in the competitive situation, a bank allocates its portfolio between pesos
b mt, dollars b ft and capital investmentsb it. There are two reserve ratios in b γt ≡ b mt
b st




b st for dollars. Bank’s proﬁts can be written as:
h
R(1 − b γt − b γ
∗




t , b d
f
t , b dn
t ) (24)
Note that there are two terms in equation (24). The ﬁrst term reﬂects the
value of the bank’s return on capital investments less payments to non-relocated
agents, so it is the proﬁt per unit deposited. The second term is total deposits,
w h i c hi sc h o s e nb yd e p o s i t o r si nr e s p o n s et ot h er e t u r n so ﬀered by the bank.
The bank takes the function s as given.
A monopoly bank maximizes proﬁts subject to the participation constraint:
V (b dm
t , b d
f
t , b dn




This constraint says that depositors do not strictly prefer to avoid inter-
mediation and participate directly in the post-relocation asset market. Then,
maximizing (24) subject to (25) and non-negativity constraints, we obtain the
optimal values of the returns oﬀered by the bank and the reserves maintained
in pesos and dollars.
10A monopolistic bank may be able to preclude agents from directly holding the primary
assets by setting a minimum deposit requirement that is equal to agents’ savings, but I do
not want to allow banks to inﬂuence savings decisions this way.
11I could have instead assumed the monopolist does some consumption in period 1, for
example.
12Jacklin [16] showed, when agents are allowed to trade in secondary markets after they
have learned their types, the insurance provision function of banks breaks down.


































































π(1 − θ) ≡ b γ
∗(It) (27)
Proof. Let λt be the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (25) at
t. Then the bank’s ﬁrst order conditions will be:




























































































From these we obtain equations (26) and (27).
























13Note that b dn




t , this means that there is a "wedge" between the return
received by relocated and non-relocated agents that depends on the nominal in-
terest rate It. This is because, in order to insure depositors against relocation
risk, banks must hold cash reserves. With positive nominal rates of interest, the
holding of cash reserves involves an opportunity cost. The higher the oppor-
tunity cost, the less insurance depositors receive against the risk of relocation.
This reﬂects the fact that the monopolist bank prices eﬃciently, but extracts
all surplus.
The following lemma presents some useful properties of b γ(It) and b γ
∗(It):































































































The same as in the competitive case, in the monopolistic banking system
b γ(It) is a decreasing function of It and b γ
∗(It) is an increasing functions of It.












The surprising thing here is that Φ(It)=b Φ(It). This means that the level
of dollarization in banking systems is independent of its structure. Whether
the system is competitive or monopolistic, the level of dollarization as deﬁned
here, will be the same. Of course this does not mean that banks will have the
same dollar-reserves. So, in the rest of the paper, I will concentrate more on
the growth eﬀect.
14Corollary 1 When R = It =1 , γ(It)=b γ(It)=πθ and γ∗(It)=b γ
∗(It)=
π(1 − θ).
Proof. By substituting R = It =1in equations (20), (21), (26) and (27)
we obtain the result.
What this corollary says is that when R = It =1 , all assets yield the same
return and there is no role for ﬁnancial intermediaries. The market would do
just as well as a competitive bank, and therefore the monopolist must oﬀer the
same contract that a competitive bank would. This implies that the monopolist
earns zero proﬁts. The value of the banking system, and hence the power of the
monopolist, comes from being able to provide insurance to agents when diﬀerent
assets have diﬀerent returns.13
3.4 Level of investment in both Systems
It is well known that there is a positive and strong relation between growth
and investment and in this model it is the main source of growth. Here, I
will concentrate on the inﬂuence that banks could have on growth, so it is
necessary to analyze how savings and investment are related to growth and how
the structure of the banking system aﬀects the economy level of investment. The
level of investment under a competitive banking system is deﬁned by Ψ(It)=1 −
γ(It) − γ∗(It) and b Ψ(It)=1 − b γ(It) − b γ
∗(It) is the level of investment under a
monopolistic banking system.
Proposition 2 For any It > 1, b Ψ(It) > Ψ(It).
















































































13Note also that the level of reserves that banks will hold is exactly equal to the liquidity





t +( 1− θ)
i
+(1−π)R1−ρ then we can write equa-

































It is easy to see that b Ψ(It) > Ψ(It).
The intuition is simple. The level of investment will be higher under the
monopolistic banking system, because the monopolist’s proﬁts actually come
from investment.
There is a positive relation between interest rates and investment. It is just
the Mundell-Tobin eﬀect again. When the nominal interest rate goes up, banks
will hold less money and therefore will place more resources into investment.
Note also that, with the Ak production function used here, the real interest
rate stays constant no matter how much is invested.
Proposition 3 There is a positive relation between nominal interest rates and
investment. This means that Ψ0(It) > 0 and b Ψ0(It) > 0.











t < 0 and
B0(It)=( ρ − 1)πθR1−ρI
ρ−2
t < 0.










































t +( 1− π)I
(1−ρ)2
ρ
t R1−ρ >π (1 − θ)+( 1− π)R1−ρ
so b Ψ0(It) > 0.
Now we are ready to go one step ahead and ask the following question: Does
this result mean that the growth rate will be higher under the monopolistic
banking system than under the competitive one?
164 General Equilibrium and Economic Growth
In this section, I show that both systems have its advantages and disadvantages
in terms of growth in a general equilibrium setting. It is easy to extract conclu-
sions for the competitive case, but diﬃcult to do the same for the monopolistic
case.
4.1 General Equilibrium with a Competitive Banking Sys-
tem
Ib e g i nd e ﬁning the equilibrium.













that satisfy the following conditions:








(ii) The capital stock evolves according to









t ) oﬀered to depositors is given by
(22).







t = R (35)
It is already known that Mt+1 = σMt; M−1 and k0 are given, and the




t ) are given by (20), (21) and (14).
Let’s deﬁne ηt ≡ st
wt as the savings per young agent. The following lemma
describes the properties of the savings rate:
Lemma 5 Under a competitive banking system,



























17(ii) η0(It) < 0 holds.14
Expression (36) shows that the savings rate can simply be written as a
function of the nominal interest rate, and it is a decreasing function. A higher
nominal interest rate reduces savings, because it distorts the banks’ ability to
provide insurance to depositors against adverse liquidity shocks, and makes
banks oﬀer a less favorable real return schedule on deposits. Depositors react
to this by saving less.
From the lemma it can be seen that the money market clears if:
Mt
Pt
= γ(It)η(It)(1 − α)Akt (37)





From (14) and (33), we have:
µt = η(It)[1− γ(It) − γ∗(It)](1 − α)A ≡ µ(It) (39)
which can also be written using the deﬁnition of the investment function
Ψ(It) as:
µ(It)=Ψ(It)η(It)(1 − α)A
For this case, we can derive a nice expression for the growth rate, speciﬁcally
we have:
µ(It)=




t + π(1 − θ)R
ρ−1





















t + π(1 − θ)R
ρ−1






From (41), it is easy to see that µ0(It) > 0. This means that inﬂation is
good for growth. This is a very common result in economies where the rate
of inﬂation is relatively low. It is what is called the "Mundell-Tobin" eﬀect
and proved empirically by Bullard and Keating [7] and Kahn and Senhadji [17].
When inﬂation is high, the relative cost of providing consumption to domestic
movers is high and therefore the bank optimally chooses to give less to them.















18Hence the bank holds fewer pesos (in real terms) and more investment, which
leads to higher growth.
Another explanation is that while higher nominal interest rates reduce sav-
ings rates (η0(It) < 0), they also induce banks to economize on peso reserves
"peso eﬀect" (γ0(It) < 0), although not in dollars (γ∗0(It) > 0).T h e " p e s o
eﬀect" dominates inducing a change in bank asset portfolio composition that
increases the rate of capital accumulation.
It remains to determine the equilibrium value of the nominal interest rate.







I will concentrate the analysis in the balanced growth path of the economy,
this means that a solution must satisfy: It+1 = It = I, and:
Iµ(I)=σR (43)
It can be seen that I is an increasing function of the money growth rate σ.




µ(It), which is also an increasing
function of σ. It is also well known that the steady state (net) inﬂation rate will
be positive if the growth rate of money supply is larger than the growth rate of
the capital stock, and negative (a deﬂation) if it is smaller.
4.2 General Equilibrium with a Monopolistic Banking Sys-
tem
F i r s tw eh a v et od e r i v es a v i n g si nt h ep r e s e n c eo fam o n o p o l yb a n k ,f o rt h i st a s k
we have to express the returns in terms of b dm
t ,s ow eh a v eb d
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This is the saving rate of a young depositor born at t.I t i s e a s y t o p r o v e
that b η







































19As in the competitive case, I deﬁne a competitive equilibrium following the








=[ 1− b γ(It) − b γ
∗(It)]b η(It)(1 − α)A ≡ b µ(It) (47)
or
b µ(It)=b Ψ(It)b η(It)(1 − α)A (48)
To derive the main implications of b µ(It),s p e c i ﬁcally how is b µ
0(It),l o o k i n g
at the next equation, it can be seen that this task is very diﬃcult analytically,
because the ﬁrst term in brackets is positive and the second term is negative,
so we need to prove which one is bigger. Looking at b Ψ0(It),i nt h ep r o o fo f




b Ψ0(It)b η(It)+b Ψ(It)b η
0(It)
i
This is really a very diﬃcult problem and making further progress analyt-
ically does not seem possible, so I will try to gain some additional insight by
using numerical simulations. Doing this, I need to make sure that the results I
report are qualitatively robust to changes in all of the parameter values. But at
this time, I only want to show that the change in the growth rate for diﬀerent
values of the nominal interest rate, can be positive or negative depending on
the parameter values chosen.
20Figure 1: Interest Rate Sensitivity of Growth-Monopolistic Banking
System
Figure 1 shows some simulations. I move one parameter at a time and I
report the results for the three parameters that change between 0 and 1,which
are π, ρ,a n dθ. The grid for the I values goes from 1 to 2, which means that
we are considering nominal interest rates that go from 0 percent (I =1 ) to 100
percent (I =2 ).16
It can be seen that depending on the parameter values b µ
0(It) will be positive
or negative, which means that the growth rate under a monopolistic banking
system will be increasing for some combination of parameters and decreasing
for other combination of parameters. For the dollarization parameter θ,t h e
pattern of this function is regular and decreasing while for the other parameters
it is very irregular.17
For this speciﬁc parameterization, changes in the risk aversion coeﬃcient ρ
appear to aﬀect more b µ
0(It) for low values of I, and in particular when ρ is far
away from 1. In the ﬁgure ρ =0 .1 corresponds to the function that starts at
16Ia s s u m e :A =1 , α =1 /3, R =1 .05 and ψ =1 .
17Ic a l lθ the dollarization parameter, but in fact 1−θ represents people who demand dollars.
210.08. The changes in the dollarization parameter θ aﬀect b µ
0(It) for all values
of I. Recall that this is the case for this speciﬁc parameterization, for other
parameterizations the sensibility can change. In any case, extensive simulations
have been performed with a variety of sets of parameter values and the results
are always qualitatively similar to those presented here.18
Certainly, if we think that in a "normal" economy the gross real rate of
interest is 1.05 and let’s say the gross inﬂation rate is 1.05 also, the gross nominal
interest rate must be near 1.1. Looking at this value, b µ
0(It) is a decreasing
function for diﬀerent valueas of θ and both increasing and decreasing for diﬀerent
values of π and ρ, in this particular example.
Again, in a balanced growth path It+1 = It = I,a n ds a t i s ﬁes:
Ib µ(I)=σR (49)
4.3 Equilibrium Rates of Growth under Competition vs
Monopoly
Here I assume that I is the same for both types of systems and I compare the
growth rates under both types of banking systems. We start by comparing the
growth rates of both systems for diﬀerent parameter values, one at a time.
18Performed simulations can be seen by request to the author.
22Figure 2: Growth Rate - Competitive Banking System
First, note that for diﬀerent values of the liquidity shock π the growth func-
tion is ﬂat. It is the same for diﬀerent values of the coeﬃcient of risk aversion
ρ when I is high. Only the growth functions for diﬀerent values of θ show an
increasing pattern. Second, as π and ρ values increase, the rate of growth of the
economy decrease; while as θ increases, the rate of growth also increases.
In this section, I am only interested to see how the growth rate changes with
diﬀerent values for the structural parameters of this economy. Nothing can be
said about magnitudes. The results presented here are only saying that small
changes in the parameters will be associated with big changes in the rate of
growth, in particular for parameters π and ρ.
A theoretical result, said that the Mundell Tobin eﬀect is present in an
economy with a competitive banking system, ﬁgure 2 shows that this is true.
It can also be seen that in all cases the growth rate is increasing in I.I t
appears also that growth reaches a constant path for interest rates higher than
20 percent, when θ is ﬁxed.
23Figure 3: Growth Rate - Monopolistic Banking System
Figure 3 is very similar to ﬁgure 2, except where the coeﬃcient of risk aver-
sion ρ changes, growth can be an increasing function for low values of I,a n d
a decreasing function for high values. This is the case when ρ is less than 0.2.
We can also see the presence of the Mundell-Tobin eﬀect, in particular when θ
changes. In the other cases when θ is ﬁxed, we can talk of a limited Mundell-
Tobin eﬀect since the economy reaches like a balanced growth path when the
gross nominal interest rate is high.
Although the growth function is ﬂat for diﬀerent values of I when π changes,
and not so ﬂat when ρ changes, there is also a negative relation between the
growth rate and these parameter values.
Let’s deﬁne the growth-gap as the diﬀerence between the growth rate under
competition and the growth rate under monopoly. Clearly if this gap is positive,
it means that the growth rate under competition is bigger than the growth rate
under monopoly (µ(I) > b µ(I)). Figure 4 shows the output gap for diﬀerent
values of parameters.
24Figure 4: Growth Gap
From the ﬁgure above, it can be seen that the growth rate under a competi-
tive banking system (µ) will be higher than the growth rate under a monopolistic
banking system (b µ), in almost all the cases that θ increases. For high values
of ρ and particularly for π, this result changes and the growth rate under a
monopolistic banking system will be higher than under a competitive banking
system. Certainly the liquidity shock and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
are key variables in explaining the growth gap between both types of economies,
as Paal et.al.[20] shown. When agents demand a lot of insurance (π and ρ are
high), then a monopolist can extract higher proﬁt s ,a n d ,a sar e s u l t ,c a p i t a l
investment and growth will be higher.
In this speciﬁc parameterization as π becomes higher, the growth rate under
monopoly is very high compared with the growth rate under competition. With
other parameterizations this result holds for diﬀerent values of ρ and not for π.
255 Welfare under Alternative Banking Arrange-
ments
In this section, I compare the depositor welfare under monopolistic versus com-
petitive banking arrangements. There are two ways to do this: i) One way
is to ask agents in one generation what monetary policy they would like the
government to follow while they are alive; ii) another way is to ask what a
benevolent social planner (or government) who takes into account the utility of
future generations would do. Here I choose the second form where the govern-
ment maximizes a weighted sum of the ex ante expected utility of depositors,
with the weight β
t assigned to the utility of the generation born at t.
It is worth pointing out that holding the level of capital stock ﬁxed at the
beginning of the period, depositors would always prefer the competitive system,
since competition generates the most consumer surplus. But this is not the
end of the story because the behavior of the capital stock is endogenous to the
model. If growth is higher under monopoly, then generations far in the future
will prefer monopoly, even though they get a worse "deal" when they deposit
their funds, because they will have much higher wages.
Based on this reasoning, if competition leads to a higher growth rate, it
must be preferred by all generations. In the previous section, I have shown that
competition must be preferred by all generations most of the time. However, in
the cases where monopoly leads to a higher growth rate there is a tradeoﬀ:t h e
current generation (and maybe some others) prefers competition but generations
far enough in the future prefer monopoly. Which one the social planner prefers
will depend on the value chosen for β, which is the weight given to future
generations.
The government objective functions, for competitive banking system and
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Using the same equations A(I) and B(I) of the proof of proposition 5, the



















1 − β [b µ(I)]
1−ρ (53)
26In order for the government’s objective function to be well-deﬁned, we must
have β [µ(I)]





An economy with a competitive banking system will be welfare improving if















b Ψ(I)b η(I)(1 − α)A
i (55)
Inequality (55) does not say anything about the parameters, so I turn again
to some numerical simulations, in order to establish some general results for the
three main parameters of the economy. The following ﬁgure shows what I call
the welfare-gap (WG), deﬁned as WG = Ω(I) − b Ω(I). If this gap is positive,
this means that a competitive banking system will be welfare enhancing.
Figure 5: Welfare Gap
27Figure 5 is very similar to ﬁgure 4 in the sense that the welfare-gap is posi-
tive in almost all cases, except when π and ρ are high. Welfare also depends on
the value assigned to β.F o rd i ﬀerent parameter values and combinations with
β, welfare can be higher under a competitive banking system or under a mo-
nopolistic banking system. It is diﬃcult to make general statements; calibrating
the model to a randomly-selected economy, either result could obtain.
As stated above, working with simulations does not allow us to really con-
clude that what we have shown in the ﬁgures is exactly what could happen
under the monopolistic case. By the other hand, what about magnitudes and
what does high π and ρ mean? This questions could only be answered with a
real case economy example.
6 Growth and Dollarization in the Bolivian Econ-
omy
In this section, I test the model in a real case economy to see if there are
sizable diﬀerences between both types of structures. I also perform a sensitivity
analysis, changing parameters one at a time. I chose Bolivia because it is a
partially dollarized economy and it has a stable banking system that has been
working with two monies, bolivianos (Bs.) and dollars (US$), for almost more
than twenty years.19
Dollarization of the Bolivian economy and particularly of the banking sys-
tem started in the middle of the 80´s, although the dollarization level of bank
deposits started to grow faster by 1990. Between the years 1985-1990 the econ-
omy started a period of stabilization and still, there was no suﬃcient conﬁdence
in the banking system.20
The banking system in Bolivia can be considered as a competitive banking
system. For a small economy like Bolivia, the fact that there are 12 banks is a
sign of competition. Of these banks, four of them are foreign banks and the rest
are domestic banks. The ﬁnancial sector is not only composed by banks, there
are other ﬁnancial institutions like "Mutuales", "Cooperativas" and also Private
Financial Funds. Here I consider only banks as they represent the main part of
the ﬁnancial sector and the model is built considering the banking system.
6.1 Calibration and Comparisons
Given that the Bolivian banking system is a competitive one, we can use the
data and the equations derived for a competitive banking system, to infer all
the parameters that are needed for the analysis. I calibrate the model using
yearly data for the period 1995-2005. For this period, Bolivia had an average
rate of inﬂation pt+1/pt of about 5.22 percent per year, with a real interest rate
19Other partially dollarized countries in Latin America are Perú, Uruguay, Mexico and
Argentina.
20People lost conﬁdence in the banking system during the hyperinﬂation episode, the ﬁrst
half of the 80´s (see Antelo [1] for a review).
28R of 6.28 percent per year. This implies that a reasonable value for the nominal
interest rate is 1.1183 percent per year.
The cost share of capital α is equal to 1/3. It is a standard value in the
literature and states that wages represent about 70% of total cost.21 The rest
of the parameters have been calibrated to match the rate of investment of banks
Ψ(It), the savings rate of depositors η(It), the growth rate of the economy µ(It)
and the level of dollarization Φ(It). These are equations (30), (36), (40) and
(23) respectively, to which we add equation (43) to form a non-linear system of
equations.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
ρ 0.74 Risk aversion coeﬃcient
π 0.2272 Liquidity shock probability
θ 0.2067 Transactions demand in local money
α 1/3 Cost share of capital
σ 1.0883 Money growth rate
ψ 0.6909 Utility function parameter
A 3.1884 Technology shock
The risk aversion coeﬀcient ρ was set as in Paal, et.al.[20], Schreft and Smith
[23] and Gomis and Smith [14] in which, similar type of models have been
calibrated. The liquidity shock parameter π is a ﬁxed probability of 23 percent
and it represents the proportion of people that will demand liquidity in both
monies. From this proportion 21 percent of people will demand local money
and the rest (79 percent) will demand dollars. This is another way to represent
that about three quarters of the deposits in the Bolivian banking system are
in dollars and the rest in local currency. The rate of growth of money σ has
been calibrated using equation (43) taking care in matching the inﬂation rate.
The technology parameter A has been calculated using equation (5) which is
an equilibrium condition for the ﬁr m sa n de s t a b l i s h e saﬁxed value for the real
interest rate R. Finally I set ψ equal to 0.7. Notice that this is a value calibrated
to be smaller than one, meaning that in the last ten years, depositors actually
valued their second period consumption more than their present consumption.
This kind of saving behavior is typical in countries where the capital market
is not well developed and banks have the essential role of allocating capital
resources.22
Table 2: Target Values
Parameter Value Target Description
Ψ(I) 0.7772 0.7772 Investment rate
η(I) 0.6261 0.626 Savings rate
µ(I) 1.0343 1.0343 Growth rate
Φ(I) 0.7962 0.7962 Level of dollarization
21Also used by Quiroz, et.al.[21] for the Bolivian economy.
22Paal, et.al.[20] states that this is also the case for Japan and uses a value for ψ equal to
0.6317.
29The growth rate is taken from the National Accounts. The investment rate
Ψ(I) which is i/s corresponds to the part of banks’ assets that are not in cur-
rency. So, it is not exactly the investment of the economy. I use a value cal-
culated from the banks balance sheet which corresponds to the credit given by
banks over total liabilities. The savings rate η(I) is s/w. To calculate this ra-
tio, one needs income wages of depositors and there is no data for this. So, I
compute this ratio from µ(I)=Ψ(I)η(I)(1 − α)A. The value of 0.62 perhaps
is a little high and certainly biased because not all the deposits in the Bolivian
banking system come from wage income. There are other incomes, like ﬁrms’
proﬁts or government payments that are also intermediated through banks. The
level of dollarization is calculated from the banks assets and it represents the
rest of the assets that are not given as credit. A big advantage of the Bolivian
banking data is that it is separated in monies, so we have m and f and this
ratio is simply f/(m + f).23
I nt a b l e3 ,w ec a ns e et h a tt h e r ea r en od i ﬀerences between the competitive
Bolivian banking system and a hypothetical monopolistic banking system. The
reserve ratios and the rates have been calculated with the same parameter values
and only up to a very accurate precision, we can see diﬀerences in both systems
(fourth column). Notice that only the level of dollarization will be exactly the
same under both systems as shown in section 2.4.
Table 3: Competitive vs Monopolistic Banking System
Variable Competition Monopoly Diﬀerences
Reserve ratio in Bs. γ =0.0454 b γ =0.0454 2.0359e-006
Reserve ratio in US$. γ∗ =0.1774 b γ
∗ =0.1774 7.9547e-006
Level of Dollarization Φ(I)= 0.7962 b Φ(I)= 0.7962 0
Investment rate Ψ(I)= 0.7772 b Ψ(I)= 0.7772 -9.9906e-006
Saving rate η(I)= 0.6261 b η(I)= 0.6261 3.6879e-006
Growth rate µ(I)= 1.0343 b µ(I)= 1.0343 -7.2031e-006
If we consider the diﬀerences between the two systems, the growth rate
under monopoly is higher than the growth rate under competition in 7.2e-006.
This result suggests that moving to a monopolized banking system in Bolivia,
at current conditions, would increase the real growth rate, though not by a
signiﬁcant magnitude. This result is also in agreement with the ﬁndings of Paal
et.al[20] for the U.S economy. They ﬁnd that a competitive structure is better
than a monopolistic structure in 2e-006 for the U.S. In any case this numbers
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Remember that µ(I)=Ψ(I)η(I)(1 − α)A ( a n dt h es a m ef o rm o n o p o l y ) ,
so we can separate growth into two eﬀects: An "investment allocation" eﬀect
that comes from Ψ(I) and a "savings rate" eﬀect that comes from η(I).I nt h i s
way, seeing that the growth rate under monopoly is "higher", means that the
"investment allocation" eﬀect is dominating the "savings rate" eﬀect. Therefore,
23Orellana [19] calculated the level of dollarization in the transactions side and obtains a
value of 0.86 for the year 1998.
30reserve ratios in both monies will be higher in the competitive banking system,
meaning that banks are investing less.
In summary, the main conclusion of this section is that the industrial or-
ganization of the banking system is not important for growth in the Bolivian
economy.
6.2 Numerical Results for the Bolivian Economy
In this section I perform a parameter sensitivity analysis. I show how the
rates of growth in both systems change as we change one parameter at a time.
I begin by changing the money growth rate parameter σ,w h i c hg o v e r n st h e
inﬂation rate pt+1/pt and also the gross nominal interest rate I (according to
the Fisher equation). In Table 4, I present some simulations, beginning with
the Friedman Rule (I =1 ). We see that an optimal monetary policy is not
good for growth since the economy only grows at 3.31 percent in both systems.
Of course a deﬂation, in this case of -5.91 percent, is required to attain a gross
nominal interest rate of 1. To generate this deﬂation, the government must be
withdrawing 3 percent of the money remaining in circulation in each period.
Table 4: Growth under diﬀerent Nominal Interest Rates
σValue I Value Inﬂation Competition Monopoly Diﬀ.
0.97205 1 -5.91% 1.0331 1.0331 -4.0494e-006
1 1.0285 -3.23% 1.0334 1.0334 -4.0842e-006
1.05 1.0794 1.56% 1.0339 1.0339 -5.3447e-006
1.1 1.1302 6.35% 1.0344 1.0344 -7.9071e-006
1.5 1.5368 44.6% 1.0374 1.0374 -5.4881e-005
2 2.044 92.33% 1.0399 1.04 -1.3612e-004
An optimal monetary policy or the Friedman Rule is not optimal for growth,
because the Mundell-Tobin eﬀect is present. We can observe that as there is
more inﬂation in the economy, the real rate of growth is higher, but without
considerable improvements. With a very high rate of inﬂation of 92.33 percent,
the economy grows only at 0.56 percentage points more than our benchmark
case. So, here it is clear that stabilization will be preferred than growth, since
the economy gains almost nothing in terms of growth by turning on the money-
printing-machine.
Then I perform simulations with the transactions demand for dollars (1−θ).
In table 5, we see that growth is negatively related to this parameter. When
there is full dollarization the economy grows at a rate of 3.37 percent and when
there is no dollarization the economy can grow at 3.62 percent. So, we can say
that it is good for growth to de-dollarize the economy.
31Table 5: Growth and Transactions Demand in Dollars
1 − θ Value Competition Monopoly Diﬀ.
1 1.0337 1.0337 -4.7790e-006
0.75 1.0344 1.0344 -7.6889e-006
0.5 1.035 1.035 -1.0352e-005
0.25 1.0356 1.0356 -1.2785e-005
0 1.0362 1.0362 -1.5005e-005
How important could be to de-dollarize the economy in terms of the real
rate of growth? The results show that not very much, between full dollarization
and no dollarization, the rate of growth improves only by 0.25 points. We can
conclude that the level of dollarization of the banking system in Bolivia, is also
not an important variable for growth.
Next, I simulate the economy for diﬀerent values of π,t os e et h ee ﬀects of
a low or high probability of liquidity crises. Growth is negatively related with
the liquidity demand and also very sensitive to it, as shown in table 6.
Table 6: Growth and Liquidity Demand
π Value Competition Monopoly Diﬀ.
0 1.3336 1.3336 4.4409e-016
0.1 1.2013 1.2013 3.5935e-007
0.25 1.0044 1.0044 -1.2114e-005
0.3 0.93907 0.9391 -3.3441e-005
0.5 0.67789 0.6785 -5.7481e-004
0.99 0.015 0.1022 -0.0872
Notice that when there is no liquidity demand, banks in either the compet-
itive or monopolistic case invest all the deposits and the economy can reach
an extremely high growth rate of 33 percent. If the liquidity demand increases
to 25 percent, the economy does not grow, and with 26 percent the economy
grows at a negative rate. Notice also that there is a threshold value of π around
11 percent. With a lower percentage the competitive banking system is better
than the monopolistic banking system, while if π is higher than 11 percent the
reverse holds and the monopoly is better.
Again we see that as people demand more insurance from banks (π is high)
the monopoly behaves better in terms of growth. Although, the real rate of
growth is negative for probabilities equal or higher than 30 percent, the rates
of growth under the monopolistic banking system are less negative than under
competition. The intuition is simple, as proﬁts come from investment, banks will
invest more, even if there is a high probability of liquidity demand. Observe that
there are 8.7 percentage points of diﬀerence between both banking structures
when all people demand liquidity (all people are movers).
In the theoretical section, we have seen that the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion ρ is also an important parameter as π for growth. The following table
shows that this is also the case for the Bolivian economy. The real rate of growth
is negatively related to ρ and also very sensitive.
32Table 7: Growth and Risk Aversion
ρ Value Competition Monopoly Diﬀ.
0.1 1.4079 1.4163 -0.0085
0.25 1.3779 1.3772 6.8636e-004
0.5 1.1424 1.1424 5.0027e-006
0.75 1.0311 1.0311 -7.0156e-006
0.99 0.9733 0.9733 -2.4229e-008
In this case, the monopolistic banking system is better in terms of growth
not only with high values of ρ, but also for small values of this parameter. In
fact, when ρ (0.166,0.537) t h eg r o w t hr a t eu n d e rac o m p e t i t i v eb a n k i n gs y s t e m
is higher than the growth rate under a monopolistic banking system. With
low values of ρ, the growth rate under both systems is extremely high. The
intuition for this result is: When ρ is far away from 1, the substitution eﬀect
of an increase in the gross nominal interest rate I is stronger than the income
eﬀect (in fact the substitution eﬀect dominates when ρ<1). The substitution
eﬀect says that consumption when old is now relatively less expensive, so young
depositors increase their savings and since the liquidity demand π is ﬁxed, these
savings are destined mainly to investment, so investment is high and the rate of
growth is high also. As ρ increases, young agents save less and so competitive
banks or the monopolistic bank invest less.
The main conclusion that can be taken from this section is that there are
two main parameters that aﬀect growth in the Bolivian economy and, as stated
in the theoretical section, in any partially dollarized economy. These are the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion of Arrow-Pratt ρ and the probability of liquidity
shocks π. They are negatively related to growth and growth is very sensitive to
them. As π or ρ increase, the growth rate decreases and also negative rates of
growth can be experienced. In most cases, the diﬀerences between competition
and monopoly are negligible. So, I can say again that the industrial organization
of the banking system is not important in a partially dollarized economy like
the Bolivian one.
6.3 Welfare in the Bolivian Economy
In this section, I just want to compare the welfare functions under the actual
competitive system and the hypothetical monopolistic system. The following
table shows the welfare values for the real parameters under both systems and
some simulations for diﬀerent values of the nominal interest rate. I assume an
initial value for k, k0 =1and β =1 /R. This condition gives us a value for β
equal to 0.94.
33Table 8: Welfare in the Bolivian Economy
I Value Competition Monopoly Welfare Gap
1.1183 131.7513 131.7548 -0.0035
1 131.1375 131.1394 -0.002
1.2 132.1302 132.1366 -0.0064
1.5 133.2869 133.3113 -0.0244
2 134.6861 134.7506 -0.0645
In table 8, it can be seen that welfare is higher under monopoly and the
welfare gap increases as the gross nominal interest rate increases. I want to
stress that these results depend primarily on β. Growth could be higher under
the monopoly system, but still yield lower welfare. This is the case if β is lower
than 0.8.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have constructed a general equilibrium model with an active
banking sector to analyze dollarization and growth for two diﬀerent structures of
the banking system, a competitive banking system and a monopolistic banking
system. The theoretical model showed that banks will hold reserves in local and
foreign money to be able to serve those people that will move early to another
location (island). But another part of deposits will be invested in capital and
this will promote growth in the economy.
Under this framework, a general intuition is that a monopolistic banking
system will invest more and because of this the economy will have a higher rate of
growth. The model shows that this is not always true. When analyzing the two
types of structures, there are two eﬀects that have to be considered: a "savings
rate" eﬀect and an "investments allocation" eﬀect. If the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates,
it is possible that an economy with a competitive banking system grows more.
The question of which eﬀect dominates depends on the combination of the three
main parameters of this economy which are: the risk aversion coeﬃcient ρ,t h e
liquidity shock probability π and the transactions demand parameter θ.I n
particular the ﬁrst two are very important to explain growth since the growth
rate is very sensitive to changes in these parameters.
In the model, I assumed that all of the monopolist’s proﬁts are invested.
Even with this extreme assumption, it is shown that competition is almost
always better. Only, for high values of the liquidity shock π and the risk aversion
coeﬃcient ρ, the monopolistic banking system can promote more growth than
the competitive banking system. A high value of these parameters means that
there is a high demand of liquidity insurance. A ‘high’ demand of liquidity
insurance is country speciﬁc.
Another conclusion that arises is the existence of a Mundell Tobin eﬀect; this
means that the growth rate is positively related to inﬂation. When the nominal
interest rate goes up, banks will hold less money and therefore will place more
resources into investment, leading to more growth in the economy.
34People are very accustomed to thinking that competition is good and monopoly
is bad. In fact, from the theoretical section it seems that a competitive banking
system is "better" than a monopolistic system in almost all situations. How
much better or how big the diﬀerences between the two systems can be is a
question answered with the help of a real example economy. I analyze Bolivia,
which is a partially dollarized economy and show that all the theoretical results
hold. But, I conclude that for Bolivia, the industrial organization of the banking
system does not matter for growth.
This is a surprising result. Working with accurate precision, it can be seen
that the growth rate under monopoly is "higher" than the growth rate under
competition. In a narrow sense, I can conclude that in the Bolivian case, the
"investment allocation" eﬀect dominates the "savings rate" eﬀect.
Changing some of the parameter values, it is seen that the rate of growth is
very sensitive to the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the probability of
liquidity crises. The liquidity demand in Bolivia is 22.72 percent. If for some
reason this probability decreases to 20 percent, the real growth rate will double.
Of course, when there is a high liquidity demand, growth rates are negative.
Here, depositors will demand a lot of insurance from banks and they will invest
less, though the monopolistic bank will always invest a little more than the
competitive banks since its proﬁts come from investments.
The transactions demand in dollars does not aﬀect growth in a signiﬁcant
way. Moving from full dollarization to non-dollarization, in terms of transac-
tions, changes the growth rate by a range of 0.25 percentage points only. Even
more, the level of dollarization is the same under both systems, so the industrial
organization is not a determinant of dollarization.
Finally, a welfare measure for Bolivia has been computed and it is shown
that in terms of welfare the monopolistic banking system is slightly superior
than the competitive banking system. This result tells us that people in Bolivia
prefer growth than risk-sharing.
The model developed here can be improved in two ways. First it would be
interesting to see how the results could change if we assume that the probability
of liquidity demand is a random variable instead of a ﬁxed number. Second, the
outside option for the monopoly can also be changed assuming autarky instead
of a capital resale market. This would add to the model the possibility to scrap
investments.
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